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INTRODUCTION

T

HOUGH internal conflict is not a new phenomenon in the
international legal order -brothers have been fighting each
other since Cain slew Abel - it has swollen into epidemic
proportions in the last two and a half decades. One observer
culled from the pages of the New York Times, well over 1,200
unequivocal examples of internal war between 1946 and 1959.1
Even the casual newspaper reader can recall how many among
the numerous recurrent "crises" of the last 10 years grew out of
internal conflicts: Nigeria, the Congo, Cyprus; and in the past
few months alone one thinks of Ceylon, Pakistan, and Northern
Ireland. Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara confirms this impression by pointing out that while there were
throughout the world 23 prolonged insurgent movements in 1958,
there were 40 by 1966.2 As the present decade opened, one
Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University Law School;
1

A.B., Wabash College, 1964; LL.B., Harvard, 1967; LL.M., Virginia, 1971.
Eckstein, Introduction: Toward the Theoretical Study of War, INTERNAL

WAR 3 (Eckstein ed. 1964).
2 R. MCNAMARA, THE ESSENCE OF SECURITY 145 (1968).
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observer estimated that one quarter of all the sovereign states
in the world were engaged in some kind of armed conflict,
largely internal .3 Even the two current conflicts most accurately characterized as "international," Vietnam and the Middle
East, are rooted in internal struggles for power.
Given, first, the pervasiveness of internal conflict and, second, the likelihood that its incidence will increase rather than
diminish in the last quarter of this century, it is surprising that
until recently few commentators have analyzed what, if any,
laws of war restrain participants therein.' The traditional laws
of war, which evolved over several hundred years before being
codified in the last century, 5 never governed any internal conflict other than a civil war.' In 1949, however, the Geneva Diplomatic Convention inserted Article 3 into the four Geneva Conventions. The common Article 3 applies to "conflicts not of an
international character." It states:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as
a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their
arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex,
birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

3 Kemp, Arms Traffic and Third World Conflicts, 577

INT'L CONCILIATION

5 (1970).
4 Although the problem of internal conflict has attracted the interest of
an increasingly large number of international law scholars, they have
focused almost exclusively on the legality of third party intervention.
See Bond, A Survey of the Norms of Intervention, 52 MIL. L. REV. 51
(1971); Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict,
9 VA. J. INT'L L. 205 (1969). The only thorough analysis of Article 3
is J.

SIOTIS, LE DROIT DE LA GUERRE ET LES CONFLICTS ARMIES D'UN CAR-

ACTURE NON-INTERNATIONAL

(1958), which unfortunately has not been

translated into English.
5 The codification mevement began in 1864 with the adoption of the first
Geneva Convention for the Protection of the Sick and Wounded. Today
the law of war is found largely though not exclusively in the four
Geneva Conventions cf 1949: the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wcunded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, Feb. 2, 1956, 6 U.S.T. 3114. TIAS No. 3362 [hereinafter cited as
GWS (Sea)]; the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Priconers of War, Feb. 2, 1956, 6 U.S.T. 3316, TIAS No. 3364 [hereinafter
cited as POW]; and the Geneva Ccnvention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Feb. 2, 1956, 6 U.S.T. 3516, TIAS
No. 3365 [hereinafter cited as GC]; and the Hague Regulations of 1907,
36 Stat. 2277, TIAS No. 539, II MALLORY TREATIES 2269.
r UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

1HE ARMY, THE LAW

OF LAND WARFARE.

Field Manual 27-10 (1956). "The customary law of war becomes applicable to civil war upon recogniticn of the rebels as belligerents." Id.
para. 11(a). Accord, H. LAUTERPACHT, II OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW 209-10 (7th ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as LAUTERPACHT].

INTERNAL CONFLICT AND ARTICLE 3
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with
respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a)

violence to life and person, in particular murder
of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

(b)
(c)

taking of hostages;
outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;

(d)

the passing of sentences and the carrying out of
executions without previous judgment pronounced
by a regularly constituted court, affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensible by civilized peoples.
(2)
The wounded, sick and shipwrecked shall be collected
and cared for....
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to
the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into
force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the
legal status of the Parties to the conflict.

While renewed interest in the applicability of the laws of war
to internal conflict has stimulated wide-ranging proposals for
new conventions and the extension of existing ones, 7 Article 3
remains the only part of the presently codified laws of war
applicable to such conflict. Little studied, it is little understood.
Although often characterized as a "convention in miniature," it
has elicited almost no commentary similar to that poured out on
the general Geneva Conventions. Since this dearth of scholarship reflects no dearth of challenging questions about its applicability and substantive content, I ask you to consider with
me the relationship of Article 3 to internal conflict.
7 The International Committee of the Red Cross, which as early as 1912

urged the application of humanitarian law to civil wars and insurrections,
is presently consulting experts on the general topic, "Reaffirmation and
Development of International Law Applicable in Armed Conflict," and
has already published A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE CONSULTATION OF
EXPERTS CONCERNING NON-INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND GUERRILLA WAR-

FARE (1970). It had previously convened three separate study groups
to examine specific internal conflict problems: Commission of Experts
for the Examination of the Question of Assistance to Political Detainees
(1953); Commission of Experts for the Study of the Question of the
Application of Humanitarian Principles in the Event of Internal Dis-

turbances (1955); and Commission of Experts for the Study of the
Question of Aid to Victims of Internal Conflicts (1962).

The United

Nations, whose International Law Commission initially ignored suggestions that it re-examine the law of war, has recently thrown its

weight behind proposals for reform.

Cf. Report of the Secretary-

General, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. No.
A/8052 (1970).
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I.

To

WHAT KINDS OF CONFLICTS DOES ARTICLE

3

APPLY?

One frustrated scholar despairs:
One of the most assured things that might be said about the
words "armed conflict not of an internationalcharacter" is that
no one can say with assurance precisely what meaning they were
intended to convey. 8

Consider, for example, the scale of conflicts below, which I have
arranged very roughly from left to right in order of the increasing scope and duration of the conflict, and the intensity
of the threat which the dissident faction poses to the established government.
Watts

Northern Ireland

Angola

Biafra

Vietnam

The scale illustrates how internal conflicts may range from
riots or insurrections through guerrilla movements to civil
wars or even mushroom into international conflicts. The problem of categorizing internal wars is further complicated because, as the fortunes of the competing factions wax or wane,
the conflict may move one way or the other along the scale.
The point is that at any given moment there are different types
of noninternational armed conflicts. In one sense, of course,
people fighting in a pareach conflict is unique -particular
ticular place at a particular time. Beyond that, however, one
would hope to articulate criteria which distinguish one kind
of internal war from another in terms of what laws of war
should regulate the conflict. That is the first challenge. There
are three sources available to aid in the definition of the Article
3's application: legislative history, state practice, and the function or purpose of the article.
A.

Legislative History

Seeking an answer, one plunges into the legislative history
(called the travaux preparatoires in the fancy lingo of the in-

ternational lawyer) only to sink into a quagmire of conflicting
views as to the meaning of noninternational conflict. Some
delegates thought they had merely incorporated the traditional
doctrine that the customary laws of war governed a belligerency but not an insurgency. The U.S. delegation argued, for
example, that the Article ought to apply only in the following
circumstances:
8Farer,Humunitarian Law and Armed Conflicts: Toward the Definitior
of "InternationalArmed Conflict," 71 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 43 (1971).

INTERNAL CONFLICT AND ARTICLE 3
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

The insurgents must have an organization purporting to have
the characteristics of a state;
The insurgent civil authority must exercise de facto authority over persons within a determinate territory;
The armed forces must act under the direction of an organized civil authority and be prepared to observe the ordinary
laws of war; and
The insurgent civil authority must agree to be bound by the
convention provisions."

The identity between these criteria and those for belligerency
is obvious.'" Delegates wishing to extend convention provisions
to groups who would be colored as insurgents under the traditional litmus paper tests could take little comfort in the American view which in effect said, "Yes, insurgents should be protected, too -so
long as they are belligerents." Though the conference did rebuff the American and other attempts to write
these explicit limitations into Article 3, many left the convention with the sense that it only governed civil strife in which
the rebels had achieved the status of belligerents.
The Committee report on this article states:
It was clear that this [armed conflict not of an international
character] referred to civil war, and not to a mere riot or disturbances caused by bandits."

Even Jean Pictet, who thinks "the Article should be applied as
widely as possible,"12 admits that the criteria embodied in the

various defeated amendments "are useful as a means of distinguishing a genuine armed conflict from a mere act of
banditry or an unorganized and short-lived insurrection."'3
Pictet does contend, however, that Article 3 also governs
conflicts which do not fit any of those criteria. Though he nowhere explicitly says so, Pictet apparently believes that even
one man brandishing a gun in another's face is noninternational conflict within the meaning of Article 3. He, too, mines
the legislative history for nuggets of proof. At the XVIIth In!) II-B

FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA

12.

i,The five requirements for belligerency are:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
11

existence of a responsible government
possession of territory
existence of an army which follows the laws of war
recognition by third states of belligerency
existence of general hostilities
LAUTERPACHT at 249. See also M. GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND
WARFARE 18-19 (1959).
II-B FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA 129.

12 J. PICTET,

COMMENTARY

I

GENEVA

CONVENTION

OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND

FIELD 50 (1952).
erence work on

13Id.

FOR

THE AMELIORATION

SICK IN ARMED

FORCES IN

THE

Pictet's four volume commentary is the standard refthe Geneva Conventions.
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ternational Red Cross Conference, which immediately preceded
the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, the International Committee
proposed adding a fourth paragraph to draft Article 2:
In all cases of armed conflict which are not of an international
character, especially cases of civil war, colonial ccnflicts, or wars
of religion, which may occur in the territory of one or more of
the High Contracting Parties, the implementing of the principles
of the present Conventicns shall be obligatory on each of the
14
adversaries.

After prolonged discussion, the Conference deleted the phrase
"especially cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion." Pictet concludes that "[t] he ommission of these words,
far from weakening the text, enlarged its scope."'1 5 Article 3 as
finally approved retains "the armed conflict not of an international character" language, and the Conference's rejection of
the various amendments which would have explicitly and narrowly circumscribed its meaning by enumerating certain specific types, arguably reinforces Pictet's argument that Article 3
applies to a wide range of conflicts.
Pictet finds further support for his view in the Conference
decision to list certain basic principles by which parties fighting
each other ought to abide. Initially, the Conference had weighed
applying all the Conventions to internal conflicts. Concerned
that brigands and bandits, for example, might thus escape punishment by claiming prisoner of war status, representatives of
various governments had tried to limit their applicability to
conflicts which, though internal in character, exhibited the
features of real war.'" The French delegation broke the logjam over the six different proposals with the suggestion that
only certain principles rather than all the provisions of the
Conventions be applicable:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
each Party to the conflict shall apply the provisions of the Pre14 The reference to Article 2 may be confusing. What ultimately became
Article 3 was initially included in draft Article 2 as paragraph 4.
15 J.PICTET, supra note 12, at 43. Mr. Pesmazoglon of Greece feared what
Pictet hoped: "I consider that the Stcckholm Conference by suppressing

the explicit references to 'civil war' and 'colonial war' gives too wide a
scope to the text." II-B FINAL RECORD Or THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE

Precisely because the Committee shared the Greek delegate's fears, the chairman had asked a working party "to draw up a
new provision cf a more limited character." Id. at 76.
16 Sir Robert Craigie, the British delegate to the Geneva Diplomatic Conference stated at the outset that he "did not believe it possible to oblige
a State to apply the Conventions to situations which were not war.
declared or not, as this idea was defined by international law." II-B
OF GENEVA 10.

FINAL RECORD

OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA

10.

INTERNAL CONFLICT AND ARTICLE 3
amble to the Convention for the protection of Civilian Persons
17
in Time of War.

The Soviet Union favored an enumeration of specific Convention provisions rather than a statement of general principles
and, therefore, proposed the following text:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the State Parties to the
present Convention, each Party to the conflict shall apply all
the provisions of the present Convention guaranteeing:
-humane treatment for the wounded sick;
-prohibition
of all discriminatory treatment of wounded and
sick practised on the basis of differences of race, colour, religion, sex, birth, or fortune1s

Although the Conference adopted the French rather than the
Russian approach, the final Article did specify more fundamental principles than those contained in the never-adopted
draft Preamble. Pictet, reflecting on the debate over Article
3, depicts the delegates as choosing between (1) applying all
the Convention provisions to a limited range of conflicts, or
(2) applying a limited number of principles to an unlimited
range of conflicts. If Pictet has fairly juxtaposed the alternatives, the Conference did choose

the latter course.

Pictet also argues the number of applicable principles is
so limited that they must be observed in all conflicts.

He asks

rhetorically:
What government would dare to claim before the world in a
case of civil disturbances which could justly be described as
mere acts of banditry, that, Article 3 not being applicable, it was
entitled to leave the wounded uncared for, to inflict torture and
mutilations and to take hostages?'"
The

regrettable

fact

is

that

some

nations

have

implicitly

claimed as much. Moreover, under traditional and still widelyheld views

about the

nature of international

law, states

are

bound to observe only those rules to which they agree;2 0 and
they have usually resisted even minimal efforts to tie their
hands in dealing with domestic enemies.

All this may suggest

that the delegates considered "an armed conflict not of an inter17 Id. at 78. In addition to the original Stockholm draft and the French
and Russian proposals, the British and Italian delegations had submitted
drafts. There was finally the text of the Working Party, a committee
which had ironed out a compromise provision. Following a discussion of
these proposals at the 24th meeting of the Special Committee of June
15, 1949, the chairman appointed a second working party composed of
representatives from Britain, France, Italy, Monaco, and the U.S.S.R.
On June 24, the Working Party reported to the 28th meeting a text,
which, with mincr revisions, became the present Article 3.
18 J. PIcTET, supra note 12, at 47.
19 Id. at 50.
20 Case of the S.S. "Lotus" [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9.
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national character" a civil war by any other name and voted
in favor of applying a limited number of principles to a limited
range of conflicts. Mounting evidence suggests that their instincts may have been sound: one of the few effective ways to
21
deal with domestic unrest is to strike swiftly and severely.
There is, however, another and to my mind more persuasive reason for taking Pictet's argument with a few grains of
skepticism. While the number of principles set out in Article
3 is small, they are very general and therefore susceptable, as
we will shortly see, of broad interpretation. Desirable as it
may be to pour increasingly detailed content into the vague
language of Article 3, one must face the dilemma that the more
specific the rules he sees embodied in the Article, the less
likely it is that the draftsmen ever envisioned their application
to riots, insurrections, or even insurgencies. If the humanitarian
must impale himself on one or the other horns of this dilemma,
he may lose less blood by opting for a more definite code which
extends some otherwise inapplicable rules to the most destructive kinds of internal conflicts. The alternative is to affirm
the continued applicability of minimal restraints already enshrined - though admittedly not always worshipped - in the
constitutions of all states. If Article 3 imposes only "a few
essential rules which [the government] in fact respects daily
under its own laws, even when dealing with common criminals, 1 2 - then it hardly justifies the effusive praise or the desper23
ate fears which attended its adoption.
No set of criteria for determining the type of internal conflicts to which Article 3 applies is buried in the Conference
committee reports. Reading through them, one nevertheless
is convinced that the delegates intended Article 3 to apply to
belligerencies or civil wars (Biafra), perhaps to insurgencies
(Angola), but never to bandits or riots (Watts) or even insurrections (Northern Ireland).
B.

State Practice
The practice of states may often dispel the fogs of legisla-

21

See generally Pye, The Roots of Insurgency and the Commencement of

22

The exhortation is Pictet's. J. PICTET, supra note 12.
But see, Ford, Resistance Movements in International Law, 7 REV.
THE INT'L RED CRoss 579 (1967):
The rules of Article 3 are of considerable importance in the case
of an armed conflict not of an international character because,
the national legislations, which are adapted to normal conditions,
may prove to be inadequate in the event of internal disturbances, so the possibility of excesses must not be ruled out. Id.
at 587.

Rebellions, in
23

INTERNAL WAR

157 (Eckstein ed. 1964).
OF
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tive history (indeed, examination of state practice is to be preferred to examination of legislative history as a method of interpreting an international agreement 24), and state practice
underscores the limited range of conflicts to which authorities
believe Article 3 applicable. Though there has been, as my
introductory comments illustrate, no absence of opportunities
for the application of Article 3 in the 25 years since its adoption, states have generally ignored it. So discouraging has
Jacques Siotis found the record of state practice that he has
concluded that governments do not regard the new rules of
25
conventional law contained in Article 3 as obligatory.
A few examples will illustrate that Siotis has ample justification for his pessimism. From 1946 until 1949 when fighting
ended, the Greek government, though it permitted the International Committee of the Red Cross to perform limited humanitarian functions, denied that it was embroiled in a civil
war and refused to abide by any laws of war.2 6 While Article
3 had not yet come into force, the ICRC did call the Greek
government's attention to the work of the 1946 Pre-Conference
Meeting of the Red Cross Societies which had resolved that in
case of an armed conflict not of an international character,
each of the parties should observe the conventions unless one
of them explicitly refused to do SO. 2' Article 3 had certainly
come into force when Biafra split from Nigeria, precipitating a
bloody civil war. The Nigerian government never admitted
any legal obligation to adhere to its provisions though it permitted the ICRC to perform certain humanitarian functions
and itself vowed to conduct military operations humanely. 28
The widely reported "night of the long knives" suggests that
the military in Indonesia did not take seriously any restraints
contained in Article 3. Within the last year both Pakistan and
Ceylon have had to employ regular military units against rebel
forces. Neither has publicly recognized any obligations under
Article 3; and press reports indicate what would appear to be
24 According to the "treaty on treaties," state practice is a primary means

of interpretation whereas preparatory work is a subsidiary means of
interpretation, resorted to only if primary sources leave "the meaning
ambiguous" or "lead to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." Article 31 and 32, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 39/27, May 23, 1969, printed in 63 AM. J. INT'L L.
875 (1969).
25

J. SioTis, supra note 4.

26

Ford, supra note 23, at 585.
M. Veuthey, The Red Cross and Non-International Conflicts, 10 INT'L
REV. OF THE RED CROSs 411, 412-13 (1970).
Farer, supra note 8, at 60. The ICRC faced many obstacles in Nigeria.
See Help to War Victims in Nigeria, 9 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSs 353

27

28

(1969).
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widespread violations of its basic provisions. 2" Likewise, Portuguese authorities have never admitted any obligation to apply
the provisions of Article 3 to rebel forces in the African provinces of Mozambique and Angola, even though the General Assembly has demanded that the native guerrillas be treated as
prisoners of war,3 0 a specific requirement quite beyond anything imposed by Article 3 itself.
Algeria was the only contemporary internal conflict in
which both sides agreed to abide by Article 3. 3 1 Though both
sides occasionally violated it (as is perhaps inevitable in any
armed conflict) they publicly and repeatedly urged each
other to respect its humanitarian provisions. Moreover, a number of countries such as Greece and Nigeria, though denying
the applicability of Article 3, did permit the Red Cross to exercise humanitarian functions. In the Yemenese Civil War, the
ICRC operated field medical hospitals.32 Following the brief
1954 revolt in Guatemala, the ICRC inspected prison facilities
and insured proper treatment of political detainees.3 3 While
these examples do not show widespread compliance with Article
3, they do create a less bleak picture than emerges from analyzing foreign office statements.
Two conclusions emerge from a survey of state practice.
First, states which quell riots, insurrections, or even revolts
quickly do not feel bound to respect Article 3. In the absence
of any widely-held expectation of the international community
that they conform to Article 3, they act under emergency or
martial law. The internal conflict is over before the international communtiy can apprise itself of the facts and generate
any pressure on the competing parties to comply with the provisions of Article 3. States do, second and nevertheless, accept
Consider the following press report, which an Associated Press newsman
in Ceylon filed:
Bodies of young men presumably killed by policemen and soldiers have been floating down rivers in groups .oward the sea
near Colombo.... Some of them were decapitated and others
riddled with bullets, their wrists bound behind their backs.
Steiba, Ceylon's Police and Army Fight Rebels with Terror, N.Y. Times,
April 25, 1971 at 1, col. 6. The Times has also reported that the Pakistani Army had orders to kill students, intellectuals, professors, doctors,
and others of leadership caliber in East Pakistan. Schanberg, Bengalis
Form a Cabinet as the Bloodshed Goes On, N.Y. Times, April 14, 1971,
at 7, col. 2.
30G.A. Res. 2395, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18. U.N. Doc. A/OR/23/S/18
(1968).
31 See, The ICRC and the Algerian Conflict, (International Committee of
the Red Cross Pamphlet, 1962).
32 See, The ICRC and the Yemen Conflict (International Committee of the
Red Cross Pamphlet, 1964).
33 Ford, supra note 23, at 586.
29
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some obligation to treat opposing forces humanely if the conflict drags on beyond several weeks or months. While this
recognition seldom takes the form of an explicit acceptance of
Article 3, it often manifests itself in acceptance of some Red
Cross initiative. Curiously enough, this practice antedates the
adoption of Article 3 and formed the basis for the original
34
ICRC proposal to the 1946 Preparatory Conference.
C. Function or Purpose
Reflecting upon the purpose or function of Article 3 may
focus some light on the kinds of internal conflicts to which
it should apply. The general purpose of Article 3 is the same
as that which animates the whole of the laws of war: to ameli-

orate suffering insofar as military necessity permits.

At the

most abstract level, then, the laws of war reflect a tension be-

tween the principles of necessity

(defense justifies resort to

violence) and humanity (fundamental human rights must be
protected)

Professor

.3

Baxter has succinctly

delineated this

tension:
The law of war is itself a compromise between unbridled license
on the one hand and, on the other, the absolute demands of humanity, which, if carried to a logical extreme, would proscribe
war altogether. Stated in other terms, the law seeks to limit the
measures of war to those which are necessary and to curb those
activities which produce suffering out of all proportion to the
military advantage to be gained. 36

While it is difficult to stake out the parameters of military
necessity, that necessity is not, as Professor Baxter suggests,
unlimited.
flicts

The demands of military necessity in

might

conceivably

legitimate

some

terror

internal contactics

not

authorized in international conflicts ,37 but they could not justify
J. PICTET, supra note 12, at 41. Article 3 still authorizes an "impartial
body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross . . . [to]
offer its services to the Parties to the Conflict" and further encourages
them to "endeavor to bring into force, by means of special agreements,
all or part cf the other provisions of the present Convention." Article
3 thus retains the right of humanitarian initiative while imposing some
minimum obligations. Before the laws of war became substantially
codified, states frequently negotiated ad hoc arrangements, as, for instance, the cartel of March 12, 1780, between France and England establishing the ransom in pounds sterling for captured field-marshalls.
35 For a thorough but brief sketch of the conceptual basis for the laws of
war, see J. PICTET, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW (1966).
3; Baxter, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 9 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. 59
(1956).
37 R. TRINQUIER, MODERN WARFARE 8 (1964).
We know that the sine qua non of victory in modern warfare
is the unconditional support of a population.... Such support
may be spontaneous, although that is quite rare and probably
a temporary condition. If it doesn't exist, it must be secured by
every possible means, the most effective of which is terrorism.
See also Thornton, Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation, in INTERNAL WAR 71 (Eckstein ed. 1964).

34
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wholesale denial of human rights. 38
Many of the same human rights protected by the laws of
war are threatened during internal conflicts. Accurate figures
are difficult to come by, but estimates on loss of life and destruction of property run high. 3 ' Torture, degrading imprisonment, and summary execution are all too commonplace. Children starve and the sick and wounded languish unattended.
The dead rot. Families may be forcibly evicted from their
homes and "relocated."'4 ' When, as is often the case, ethnic
or religious differences permeate the conflict, the savagery
would warm the heart of Ghengis Khan, who cried:
The greatest happiness is to vanquish ycur enemies, to chase
them before you, to rob them of their wealth, to see those dear
to them bathed in tears, to clasp to your bosom their wives and
41
daughters.

Article 3 denies such happiness to would-be Ghengis Khans.
Since the protection of certain human rights is the chief
purpose of Article 3, one might reasonably conclude that it
should come into force in any internal conflict which endangered those rights. Inquiry should focus on the nature of
the human rights being threatened rather than on the nature
of the conflict (i.e., whether it was a riot, insurrection, insurgency, or belligerency). The use of regular combat units in
tactical operations would be the most important criterion justifying application of laws of war. Both because of the weapons
which soldiers are likely to use (artillery, fire and chemical
weapons, for example) and the probable scope of any military
operation (the use of air cover or support, for example), the
threat to human rights normally protected by the laws of war
isgreat.
It was during an internal war- the American Civil War - that a government is-ued the first official document recognizing humanitarian
limitations on military necessity. Para. 14-16 General Order 100, "Instructicns for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field" (April 24, 1863). During the same war, however, General Sherman, who proved a man of his word, explained why an internal war
dictated a strategy of terror and devastation:
[T]his war differs from European wars in this particular; we
are not only fighting hostile enemies, but a hostile people, and
must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of
war, as well as their organized armies.
Quoted in C. Fenwick, INTERNATIONAL LAW 568 (3d ed. 1948). For an
analysis of the continuing relevance of the principles embodied in General Order 100 to the conduct of unconventional warfare, see Garner,
General Order 100 Revisted, 27 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1965).
39 Cf. D. de Huan and J. Tinker, Refugee and Civil War Casualty Problems
in Indcchina (Staff Report of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on
Refugees).
40
Johnson, Preface to CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE,
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (1971).
41 Quoted in L. MONTROSS, WAR THROUGH THE AGES 144 (1944).
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Another criterion for the application of the laws of war
is the duration of the conflict. As the fight drags on, the disruption of normal life intensifies. The sick and wounded demand treatment; the hungry, food; the homeless, shelter. The
number of prisoners grows; and difficult questions about their
classification, punishment, detention, and care must be answered. All of these problems are common to international
conflicts, and large portions of the laws of war were designed
to provide humanitarian solutions.
Foreign troop participation in tactical combat operations
is a third criterion for the application of the laws of war. There
is no litmus paper test by which one can distinguish an internal
war from an international war; and while one can imagine an
internal conflict in which foreign troops participate on either
side without thereby internationalizing it, their presence creates
conditions which demand application of the laws of war. Foreign assistance may, for example, augment native firepower
and thereby increase the potential destructiveness of their
operations. Failure to treat captured soldiers from foreign
countries as prisoners of war will exacerbate tensions and may
trigger a spiraling wave of inhumane reprisals.
What may be called the "intensity" of the conflict for want
of a more descriptive term is a fourth criterion for the application of the laws of war. Sporadic raids and firefights do not
greatly endanger large numbers of people, nor are they apt
to provoke government use of combat troops. They may entail
an occasional violation of a human right normally protected
by the laws of war, but the acts will probably also violate
domestic criminal law, as, for example, in the case of a political assassination. When the fighting intensifies, these violations proliferate. It is at that point-when the fighting becomes the bloodiest-that the laws of war should be applied
to prevent wholesale slaughter and destruction. Neither side
wins if it inherits only the wind. A stable government rests
upon a loyal people, and one does not induce loyalty by raping
and pillaging. A viable economy requires productive farms and
industries. The farmer cannot reap from the salted earth;
neither can the factory worker conjure wares from the rubble
of bombed industries. An efficient state needs doctors, enginers, lawyers, and scientists. Whichever side wins will require
their professional skills and can ill afford their loss through
mass executions or indiscriminate bombardment.
A group of distinguished scholars has identified several
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other criteria which would indicate a need to apply the laws
of war to an internal conflict:
It is submitted that even though governments fighting insurgents generally refuse formally to recognize the "belligerency," they acknowledge the seriousness of the insurgency rather
clearly through alterations in their normal domestic laws and
institutions. Some of the signs that internal strife ought not to
be considered as purely domestic are the following:
a. imposition of martial law or state of siege generally or
in certain areas over a long period of time;
b. organization of emergency military or paramilitary security agencies, inter-departmental committees or councils
operating with extraordinary powers similar to those exercised
in wartime;
c. enforcement of laws and institutions commonly associated with wartime such as high draft calls, extraordinary
measures with respect to food and other necessities, transportation and the like;
d. drastic increase in detentions and other deprivations of
civil rights for political or security reasons, detentions over long
periods without trial, increase in trials not characterized by
minimal due process, or at least, due process as it was supposed
42
to exist in the state in normal times.

These criteria are nothing more than contextual factors
which provide a sounder index to those circumstances in which
human rights normally protected by the laws of war are endangered than do the traditional categories of riot, insurrection,
insurgency, and belligerency.

It

is

true that these traditional

categories reflected, roughly, differences in the duration, troop
involvement,

and intensity of

internal

conflicts.

Riots or in-

surrections seldom last long. Military troops usually pour onto
the battlefields only during insurgencies or belligerencies. One
might therefore conclude that the rights protected by the laws
of war are far more likely to be denied during an insurgency
or belligerency than during a riot or insurrection because the

government will, when combating the former, usually conduct
the kind of operations and adopt political measures that often
generate law of war violations. Policies adopted to control riots
and put down insurrections may, of course, also violate certain
human rights; but to the extent that the rights violated are

other than those guaranteed by the laws of war, they should
have no application.

The point remains, however, that the tradi-

tional categories do not invariably reflect accurately the degree
of troop involvement, the duration and intensity of an internal

42 INSTITUTE
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conflict, or the significant changes in domestic policies outlined
above.
A moment's reflection upon the factor of jurisdictional competency within the international legal order reinforces the conclusion that Article 3 ought to apply, even under a purpose
test, only to those internal conflicts far along the scale in terms
of scope, duration, and intensity. The sovereign equality of
states remains a fundamental building block of the international
legal order, 43 and states retain a considerable degree of absolute
discretion in regulating events within their territory. The idea
is enshrined in the United Nations Charter, which provides:
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state .
,",44
The continuing General Assembly consideration of the South African
policy of apartheid has-narrowed the scope of the domestic
jurisdiction reservation ,4 and the growing body of international humanitarian law demonstrates a growing international
concern in the very problems we have been discussing. As I
implied in my survey of state practice, a state will nevertheless still claim absolute discretion to deal with riots and
insurrections.
II.

How

DOES ONE DETERMINE THE SUBSTANTIVE
CONTENT OF ARTICLE 3?

We now turn our attention to the second major challenge
inherent in Article 3. To what situations does it apply? For
example, many metropolitan police forces use dum-dum bullets, 46 which have long been considered illegal per se in international law. 47 Are we then to conclude that their use against
bank robbers is illegal? Most governments regularly use nontoxic tear gases to disperse riots. If, as certain authoritative
43 Friedmann, Intervention, Civil War and the Role of International Law,
1965 PROc. Am.Soc. INT'L L. 67, 67-68.
44 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
45 See generally McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations:
the Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1968).
41;Cf. Police in Memphis are Criticized Over a Rash of Killings on Duty
and Use of Dumdum-Like Bullets, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1970, at 34, col. 1.
47 The Judge Advocate General of the Army has recognized that "there
is an international law restriction . . . on the types of bullets that may
be used in both smooth-bore and rifled small arms." Opinion No. JAG.
W 1960/1305, filed January 4, 1961 in the office of the Judge Advocate
General of the Army. The restrictions date back to the St. Petersburg
Declaraticn of 1868, (PHILLMORE, III INTERNATIONAL LAW 160-62 [3d ed.
1885]) and are summarized in ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, supra note 5:
Usage has, however, established the illegality of the use of . . .
irregular-shaped bullets . . . and the scoring of the surface or
the filing off of the ends of the hard cases of bullets. Id. at 34.
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sources believe, the Geneva gas ban extends to non-toxic gases, 48
must we also conclude that governments must use other, presumably more humane, methods of riot control? I raise the
questions not to answer them but to re-emphasize the subtle
interplay between the decision to ascribe a particular substantive content to the Article, and the decision to apply it to particular types of internal conflicts.
I think that the best way to get a handle on Article 3's substantive content is to analyze a series of hypotheticals. I assure
you that my examples are realistic if not real. Their realism is
a healthy antidote to academic theorizing, for these hypotheticals require us to fit our textual analysis to battlefield realities.
There are three techniques of interpretation which may be
used in applying the substantive content of Article 3 to these
hypothetical situations. One is to analyze the language of the
Article alone. Another approach is to analyze analogous but
more detailed provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Finally,
one might analyze Article 3 in light of a subjective, humanitarian standard.
A.

Analyzing the Language of Article 3
The first question one asks himself is who is entitled to the
humane treatment guaranteed in Article 3. Consider the following hypothetical case. Government troops engage a rebel band
entrenched in a mountain redoubt. The commander of the government forces decides to gas the rebels with an asphyxiating
gas. The Geneva Gas Protocol of 192541 forbids the use of such
gas. Most scholars now argue that the prohibition on the use
of gas is customary international law and therefore binds
equally those who did not sign the Geneva Protocol.50 For our
present purposes let us assume that customary international
law does prohibit the use of asphyxiating gas or that the government is a signatory. Does Article 3 prohibit the commander
from employing it against the rebels in their mountain stronghold?
Article 3 does not explicitly forbid the use of gas or, for
that matter, any other weapon. It does, however, in addition
to imposing the general requirement of humane treatment, forCf. G.A. Res. 2603 (A), 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 30, p. 16 (Dec. 16, 1969)
reprinted in 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 393 .(1970).
49 L.N.T.S. 65. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare.
50 See generally Bunn, Banning Poison Gas and Germ Warfare: Should
the United States Agree?, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 375 (1969).
48
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bid cruel treatment. One could plausibly equate "cruel treatment" with the infliction of "unnecessary suffering," the standard found in Article 23 of the Hague Rules5' and the basis for
outlawing almost all illegal weapons of war.
Whom does Article 3 protect? It protects only non-combatants, i.e., persons taking no active part in the hostilities. Article
3 would therefore not prohibit the commander from gassing
rebels in their mountain stronghold, not because gas does not
constitute cruel treatment (that is, as I have indicated an open
question), but because combatants fall outside the protective
ambit of the Article. Article 3 simply does not require that
government forces treat resisting rebels humanely.
The implication of this conclusion is disheartening. The
laws of war may be broadly divided into two branches: the
rules protecting non-combatants, often called the law of Geneva;
and the rules regulating conduct of hostilities, often called the
law of The Hague.52 While, as we shall see, Article 3 does incorporate much of the law of Geneva, it incorporates almost
none of the law of The Hague. Consequently, government forces
need not play by the "game rules" - particularly the provisions and principles of the Annex to the 4th Hague Regulation of 1907 on weapons, targets, ruses, and strategems - unless
their actions would unjustifiably subject non-combatants to
inhumane treatment.
A second hypothetical case will illustrate this possibility.
Government forces receive sniper fire from a small village.
The village is suspected of rebel sympathies, and reliable intelligence sources report that a rebel unit has set up headquarters
for its local operations in the village. The commander of the
government forces calls in artillery fire on the village. A Red
Cross medical unit is hit and several patients killed. Has the

51 It is almost impossible to determine what constitutes "unnecessary suffering," and some have therefore argued that it imposes no effective
restraints on the use of new weapons. Cf. J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 550-51 (1959).
52 The distinction is misleading for two reasons. The first is that documents signed at either The Hague or Geneva often contain provisions
with respect to both the protection of non-combatants and the conduct of
hostilities. Much of the early law on treatment of ncn-combatants for
example, was embodied in the 1907 Hague Regulations (e.g., Articles
4-20 dealt with prisoners of war). And the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol,
to take another example, would fall within the law of The Hague. Secondly, the distincticn is misleading to the extent that it implies that different purposes underlie the two categories. The purpose of the law of
The Hague is not simply to regulate or govern the conduct of tactical
operations but rather to reduce human suffering and protect fundamental human rights by limiting operational excesses. Its purpose is
thus the same as that of the law of Geneva.
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commander violated Article 3? Article 25 of the Hague Regulation states: "The attack or bombardment, by whatever means,
of towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended
is prohibited.15 3 Article 27 says that in any attack non-military
targets such as schools, hospitals, churches, and museums should
be spared.5 4 Damage to such institutions and loss of innocent
lives does not violate the laws of war, however, so long as it is
incident to a lawful attack upon a legitimate military target. 55
While, as our first hypothetical showed, the rebel soldiers are
not protected persons, the medical staff and patients are. They
are entitled to humane treatment; and if one assumes, as I do,
that protection of non-combatants is the underlying purpose for
restricting bombardment, then the answer becomes first one of
interpretation, and second of fact. The interpretative question
is one we have already analyzed and shall analyze again: what
constitutes "humane treatment"? The general requirement of
humane treatment may be too slender a basis upon which to
incorporate all the rules whose purpose is protection of noncombatants, but we also find in Article 3 the injunction that
the "wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for." Like
all the provisions in Article 3, this, too, is very general. At a
minimum, however, one could surely imply that medical establishments cannot be attacked and that hospital staff must be respected. Otherwise, it is difficult to see how "the wounded and
sick" can be "collected and cared for." One may then conclude
that the general requirements of humane treatment and care for
the sick and wounded preclude indiscriminate bombardment
in the circumstances outlined above.
The second question is the factual one: did the attack violate the rules of bombardment? Was the artillery strike an excessive use of firepower? Was the Red Cross unit clearly
marked? Was it located dangerously near a legitimate military
553
Customary practice has modified this rule. Attacks upon military targets in undefended cities are legal. K. RABY, BOMBARDMENT OF LAND
TARGETS -

MILITARY NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY INTERPELLATED

(an

unpublished thesis presented to the Judge Advocate General's School
1968). See also, ICRC draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers
Incurred by the Civilian Population in Times of War. Article 6
specifies:
[S]hould members of the civilian population . . . be within or in
close proximity to a military cbjective they must accept the risks
resulting from an attack directed against that objective.
54 The immunity is not absolute, however. If enemy forces are using the
institution for a military purpose (e.g., using a church steeple as a lookout) opposing forces may attack it.
55 Cf. Article 6, ICRC I DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR MILITARY
LAWYERS 61, 63 (1969).
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target? One cannot determine whether the commander violated
5
Article 3 by shelling the village unless he knows "the facts."
Analyzing Analogous Geneva Conventions
The importance of the facts does not make the rule unimportant, however, and we must know what it means. A third
hypothetical case will illustrate an interpretive means by which
we can flesh out the skeletal provisions of Article 3 by analogy
to provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Regular government
forces capture a guerrilla leader. He is wounded, though not
seriously, and is in some pain. He has not eaten in three days
and is hungry. The commander of the regular army forces tells
the captured man that he will get him medical attention and
food as soon as he answers some questions. The commander
then asks the prisoner several questions about the location and
strength of guerrilla units. Although the prisoner initially refuses to answer, he finally gives his interrogator the information, after which he gets the promised food and treatment.
The prisoner is clearly a protected person. True, he is a
rebel. But he is no longer fighting; he is in the "power" or
"hands of" government forces. He is hors de combat and therefore must be treated as a non-combatant. Does questioning
a man when he is hungry and wounded, and conditioning feeding and treatment on his answering, violate the obligation to
treat humanely? Is it torture? Cruel treatment? Humiliating
and degrading? Does such treatment violate the command to
attend the wounded? Where does one look for some standards
by which he can judge what constitutes torture or cruel
treatment?
One alternative is to look to the more detailed provisions
of the Geneva Conventions. For example, one could look at
Article 17 of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention which
establishes guidelines for interrogating prisoners. Article 17
states:
B.

No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion
may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to
to any unanswer may not be threatened. insulted, or exposed
5
pleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind. 7
56 An example of the growing literature which demonstrates little interest
in "the facts" of U.S. Army operations in Vietnam is Sheehan, Should
We Have War Crimes Trials?, N.Y. Times, March 28, 1971, § 7, at 1, col. 1.
57 The Article is a direct lineal descendant of Article 9 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations:
Every prisoner of war is bound to give, if he is questioned
on the subject, his name and true rank, and if he infringes
this rule, he is liable to have a curtailment of the advantages accorded to prisoners of his class.
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The Article does not bar all questioning. 58 It does prohibit all
coercive tactics. The Article is not without ambiguity, however, for what constitutes "disadvantageous treatment" remains
a question of interpretation. One could nevertheless argue that
the denial of food and medicine falls within the scope of any
reasonable definition of "disadvantageous treatment." This view
is reinforced by the frequent charge to treat the sick and
wounded "without any adverse distinction founded on sex, race,
nationality, religion, political, or other similar criteria."59' Refusal to answer questions should not preclude care, since "only
urgent medical reasons" determine priority of treatment.60
Other Convention articles point to the same conclusion.
Captors must evacuate the prisoner from "the combat zone" as
quickly as possible." One could imply then that beyond ascertaining identity, any questioning must be delayed until the
prisoner is interned in "camps situated in an area far enough
from the combat zone to be out of danger.' 12 Moreover, the
captor must "supply prisoners with sufficient food and potable
water, and with the necessary clothing and medical attention. ' 3 The various articles just surveyed suggest one answer:
the commander violated the law by denying the prisoner food
and medical attention.
As a method of interpretation, this approach has much to
commend it. It refers us to a pre-existing detailed body of law.
Many Convention articles, for example, establish procedures
for implementing the humanitarian dictates of the law; and
since procedural safeguards are almost entirely unspecified in
Article 3, reference to the Geneva Conventions as a whole
would provide an authoritative solution to many problems of
insuring humane treatment. Where better to look for the
meaning of the general principles contained in Article 3 than
in the detailed provisions of the Geneva Conventions from
which they were deduced?
One objection to this approach is that it in effect incorporates the whole of the Geneva Conventions into Article 3 and
thereby makes applicable to internal conflicts a whole body of
techniques under the
Geneva Conventions, see Glcd & Smith, Interrogation under the 1949
Prisonersof War Convention, 21 MIL. L. REV. 145 (1963).
59 E.g., common Article 3; GWS Article 12; GWS (Sea) Article 12; POW
Article 16; GC Article 13.
60 GWS and GWS (Sea) Article 12.
61 POW Article 19.
62 Id.
63 Id. Article 20.
58 For a "handbook" on permissible interrogation
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law whose applicability the Geneva Diplomatic Conference explicitly rejected. The present hypothetical illustrates the point
nicely. Article 3 does not grant prisoner of war status to anyone. As noted earlier, delegates to the Geneva Diplomatic Conference rejected the notion that their governments should
treat traitors--and that is what a rebel is from the government's point of view -- as prisoners of war because among other
things they could then claim immunity from prosecution under
domestic criminal law.14 Established governments have a vested
interest in making the cost of unsuccessful revolution high; and
even the international community, whose concern must be as
much with stability as self-determination in a nuclear age, has
a considerable interest in shoring up the price levels. Immunizing captured rebels from ordinary or even extraordinary criminal processes may dangerously lower the cost of revolution.
An answer to this objection may be that one need not incorporate all of the Geneva Conventions' provisions; rather,
he need only look to certain provisions for authoritative standards for humane treatment. In the context of the present hypothetical, for example, the question is not whether the prisoner
may be prosecuted under domestic criminal law but whether
his captor may deny him food and medicine until he answers
intelligence questions. One can conclude after interweaving
various relevant articles in the POW and Sick and Wounded
Conventions that denial constitutes inhumane or cruel treatment without also concluding that the rebel cannot be tried as
a traitor. Assimilating a rebel to a prisoner of war for one
purpose does not dictate assimilating him to a prisoner of war
for all purposes. Some provisions of the POW Convention might
prove unworkable in the peculiar context of internal war. It
is far more difficult, for example, to determine "the combat
zone" in a guerrilla conflict than in a World War II-type war,
which was the paradigm in the draftsmen's minds. Others may
be incompatible with Article 3 provisions relevant to the present hypothetical; for instance, there is the clause in Article 3
permitting trial and execution. This clause would seem to permit prosecution of rebels even though prisoners of war could
not be.
not without advantage to the established
government; for while they may not be prosecuted under the ordinary
criminal law, they may be held for the duration of the conflict. Were
the rebel prosecuted, convicted, and jailed for committing a crime, he
could upon completion of his sentence return to the jungle to continue
the revolution - a prospect unlikely to delight the incumbent authorities.

64Treating rebels as POW's is
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C.

Analyzing Article 3 in Light of a HumanitarianStandard
Somewhat similar to the look-to-the-Geneva-Convention
-approach is the I-know-it-when-I-see-it approach to interpretation. This latter approach would eschew reliance on the Geneva
Conventions in favor of an admittedly subjective case-by-case
judgment. While subjective, the determination need not be
irrational. One would strike some balance between the right
of an established government to protect itself against domestic
enemies and the human rights of the individual. In the context
of the present problem, the observer would weigh the importance of intelligence information to government forces combating guerrillas. Professor Farer, whose enthusiasm for the
revolutionaries of the world is undisguised, admits that "in
guerrilla war the most serious problem facing the incumbents is
a lack of intelligence.... .'5
Recognizing the importance of
combat intelligence, the observer would keep in mind the
mounting evidence that coercion yields unreliable information. 6
If pragmatic reasons also underscore prohibitions on coercion,
the observer would be especially sympathetic to humanitarian
claims. In assessing the scope of such claims, he could examine
not only the Geneva Conventions but other documents such as
state constitutions and comparative criminal practice, human
rights covenants, reports of the International Committee of
the Red Cross, and General Assembly resolutions.
Conceivably, the I-know-it-when-I-see-it approach might
yield more humane results. The previously mentioned growth
in humanitarian law has occurred since the Geneva Conventions
were opened for ratification. The cutting edge of the law has
now advanced well beyond their provisions, even those such
as Article 3 which struck some as dangerously avant-garde at
the time. Looking to recent developments in humanitarian
law, as well as to the Conventions themselves, for standards by
which to measure "humane treatment" would incorporate into
Article 3 more stringent safeguards than are found in the
Geneva Conventions alone.
CONCLUSION

The notion that the laws of war should apply to internal
conflicts may well be an idea whose time has come. Many of
the present rules of war were initially advocated by scholars
and later included in draft agreements which never came into
05
06

Farer, supra note 8, at 64.
The Army Military Intelligence School teaches that one cannot get information from a dead man.
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force before finally finding general expression in formal international conventions. The general principles were then elaborated in increasing detail in subsequent conventions. The idea
that parties to an internal conflict should respect the laws of
war has a similar lineage. Long advocated by scholars and included in draft agreements, it finally emerged in limited form
in Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. We must thus
all hope that the ongoing discussions at the United Nations
and in Geneva will produce at an early date tangible results:
a new and detailed international covenant for the protection
of victims of internal conflict.
In the meantime we must persuade with wit and imagination, a straight face and a reasonable voice, governments to
7
accept broad obligations under Article 3 to treat all humanely.'
Though states have too often ignored Article 3, their actions
nevertheless demonstrate a surprising sensitivity to humanitarian claims, particularly when those claims are based on explicit Convention provisions. The language of Article 3 is unfortunately general, but selective incorporation of the more
detailed rules of the Geneva Conventions can flesh out its general language. While it is true that the legislative history of
Article 3 shows no intent to incorporate all the Convention
provisions, their purpose was identical: to ameliorate the sufferings of war. And it is the nature of the suffering to be
alleviated, not the nature of the conflict, that should define the
application of the laws of war to situations of internal strife.
Otherwise, we shall have kept the humanitarian promise to the
ear of the innocent but broken it to their hope.

4;7 This

obligation might be best implemented in directives to military personnel. The soldier inevitably makes law on the battlefield. If he has
received sound instruction in his responsibilities, and if he has been
issued directives which embody sound principles, he will usually make
good law. The quality of the directives is all important because every
army runs on directives. I would therefore suggest that we draw up
model directives cn subjects such as detention and interrogation. These
directives would "concretize" the general principles in the penumbra
of Article 3.

